What is Hacking’s argument for entity realism? by Miller, Boaz
  
What	is	Hacking's	Argument	for	Entity	Realism?		
(Forthcoming	in	Synthese)	
Boaz	Miller	
	
Abstract	 According	 to	 Ian	 Hacking’s	 Entity	 Realism,	 unobservable	 entities	 that	 scientists	 carefully	
manipulate	 to	 study	other	phenomena	 are	 real.	Although	Hacking	presents	his	 case	 in	 an	 intuitive,	
attractive,	 and	 persuasive	 way,	 his	 argument	 remains	 elusive.	 I	 present	 five	 possible	 readings	 of	
Hacking’s	argument:	a	no‐miracle	argument,	an	indispensability	argument,	a	transcendental	argument,	
a	Vichian	argument,	and	a	non‐argument.	I	elucidate	Hacking’s	argument	according	to	each	reading,	
and	review	their	strengths,	their	weaknesses,	and	their	compatibility	with	each	other.			
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1. Introduction	
Ian	Hacking’s	Entity	Realism	(ER)	 is	an	 influential	position	within	 the	Scientific	Realism	(SR)	
debate.	According	to	ER,	unobservable	entities	that	scientists	carefully	manipulate	to	study	other	
phenomena,	 such	 as	 electrons	 that	 physicists	 spray	 from	an	 electron	 gun,	 are	 real.	 Although	
Hacking	presents	his	case	in	an	intuitive,	attractive,	and	persuasive	way,	his	argument	for	ER	
remains	 elusive.	 I	 suggest	 five	 interpretations	 of	 Hacking’s	 argument	 for	 ER:	 a	 no‐miracle	
argument	(NMA),	an	indispensability	argument,	a	transcendental	argument,	a	Vichian	argument,	
and	a	non‐argument.1	I	draw	the	distinctions	between	these	different	kinds	of	argument	based	
on	the	different	epistemic	warrants	they	supposedly	enjoy.		
Within	this	paper,	I	am	less	interested	in	the	question	of	which	reading	most	accurately	
captures	Hacking’s	intentions,	and	more	with	the	question	of	which	reading	best	supports	ER.	
But	I	acknowledge	that	any	answer	to	the	latter	should	be	true	to	the	former’s	spirit.	The	next	
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section	reviews	SR	and	situates	ER	within	it.	The	subsequent	sections	respectively	discuss	the	
five	different	 interpretations,	 and	 the	 last	 section	examines	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	different	
arguments	can	work	together	making	a	robust	case	for	ER.		
2. ER	within	SR	
Roughly,	 SR	 states	 that	 science	 aims	 at	 discovering	 the	 truth	 about	 nature,	 and	 succeeds	 in	
attaining	 this	 aim.	A	more	precise	 characterization	of	 SR	 is	 as	 a	 conjunction	of	 three	 theses,	
divided	into	six	sub‐theses:	
Metaphysical:	
(M1)		 There	exists	a	mind‐independent	world.	
(M2)		 This	world	has	a	unique	structure.	
Semantic:	
(S1)		 Scientific	 claims,	 particularly	 about	 unobservables,	 should	 be	 taken	 at	
their	 face	 value;	 namely,	 they	 should	 be	 interpreted	 as	 purporting	 to	
literally	describe	the	furniture	of	a	mind‐independent	world.	
(S2)	 Whether	scientific	claims	are	true	or	false	is	determined	by	the	actual	state	
of	affairs	in	the	world,	independently	of	our	ability	to	test	of	verify	it;		
Epistemic:	
(E1)	 The	aim	of	science	is	attaining	the	truth	about	nature,	particularly	about	
the	unobservable	world.	
(E2)	 Mature	empirically	successful	scientific	theories	achieve	this	aim,	or	come	
close	 to	 achieving	 it;	 namely,	 mature	 empirically	 successful	 scientific	
theories	are	true	or	approximately	true	of	their	intended	domains.2		
Different	scholars	parse	these	sub‐theses	slightly	differently,	but	this	threefold	division	
is	now	standard	(Chakravartty	2013).	Some	clarifications	and	contrasts	are	in	order.	Some	of	the	
sub	theses	contrast	SR	with	commitments	of	antirealist	positions.	(M1)	is	contrasted	with	the	
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idealist	denial	of	the	existence	of	an	external	world,	and	with	Kantian	perspectivism,	which	holds	
that	experienced	reality	is	inescapably	mediated	by	human	cognition.	(M2)	rejects	nominalism,	
which	 denies	 a	 natural	 grouping	 of	 the	 world	 into	 essences	 or	 kinds.	 (S1)	 rejects	 logical	
empiricists’	 and	 classic	 instrumentalists’	 view	 that	 observable	 terms	are	mere	 shorthand	 for	
describing	observable	phenomena.	(S2)	states	a	non‐epistemic	theory	of	truth.	It	is	contrasted	
inter	 alia	 with	 verificationism,	 which	 states	 that	 the	 truth	 value	 of	 claims	 depends	 on	 their	
verification	method.	For	satisfying	(S2),	realists	typically	adhere	to	a	correspondence	theory	of	
truth,	according	to	which	claims	are	true	if	they	correspond	to	the	actual	state	of	affairs	in	the	
world,	and	false	otherwise.	SR	is	committed	to	some	form	of	correspondence	between	scientific	
claims	about	unobservables	and	reality,	but	some	realists	subscribe	to	a	deflationary	account	of	
truth,	 and	 shoulder	 the	 burden	 of	 correspondence	 in	 other	 places,	 such	 as	 one’s	 theory	 of	
reference,	or	a	theory	of	truth‐making.3	(E1)	is	contrasted	with	constructive	empiricists’	view	
that	 the	 aim	 of	 science	 is	 empirical	 adequacy,	 i.e.,	 attaining	 the	 truth	 only	 about	 observable	
phenomena,	 and	 with	 classic	 instrumentalists,	 who	 posit	 merely	 providing	 useful	 tools	 for	
prediction	and	control	as	the	aim	of	science.	(E2)	expresses	epistemic	optimism	about	science	
meeting	its	aim.	Not	all	scientific	realists	accept	all	the	above	sub	theses.	Thus,	there	are	many	
possible	partly	realist	positions,	because	the	number	of	possible	combinations	that	accept	only	
some	of	these	sub	theses	is	large.	
A	strong	argument	for	SR	is	NMA.	Its	most	famous	formulation	is	by	Putnam	(1975,	73):	
“The	positive	argument	for	realism	is	that	it	is	the	only	philosophy	that	doesn’t	make	the	success	
of	 science	 a	miracle”.	 NMA	 ties	 together	 empirical	 success,	 reference	 of	 theoretical	 terms	 to	
unobservable	entities,	and	truth.	NMA	is	an	inference	to	the	best	explanation	(IBE).	Under	the	
IBE	 model,	 we	 legitimately	 infer	 the	 truth	 of	 our	 best	 explanation	 of	 some	 given	 facts.	
Explanatory	merits	 such	 as	 simplicity	 and	 scope	determine	which	 explanations	 are	 the	best.	
Explanatory	 considerations	 determine	 plausibility,	 so	 the	 best	 explanation	 is	 the	 likeliest	
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explanation	 (Lipton	 2004).	 NMA	 states	 that	 there	 are	 only	 two	 possible	 types	 of	 putative	
explanations	for	the	empirical	success	of	science:	explanations	that	appeal	to	the	truth	of	science,	
or	miraculous	explanations.	Because	putative	explanations	that	appeal	to	the	truth	of	science	is	
deemed	a	superior	explanation	to	a	miracle,	we	legitimately	infer	their	truth.	
An	antirealist	argument	against	NMA	is	the	pessimistic	induction	(PI),	which	challenges	
the	relations	between	success,	reference,	and	truth.	Laudan	(1981)	gives	a	long	list	of	theories	
from	 the	 history	 of	 science	 which	 were	 empirically	 successful	 yet	 false	 and	 contained	 non‐
referring	terms.	One	way	to	construct	Laudan’s	PI	is	as	an	enumerative	induction:		
(PI0)		 Since	all	past	empirically	successful	scientific	 theories	are	 false,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	
present	empirically	successful	theories	are	also	false.		
An	arguably	better	way	to	construct	the	argument	(Lehoux	2012,	207)	is	as	a	reductio	of	NMA:	
(PI1)	 If	NMA	is	right,	then	very	nearly	all	empirically	successful	theories	will	be	true.	
(PI2)		 But	we	have	a	long	list	of	false	successful	theories.	
(PI3)	 Therefore,	NMA	is	false.		
A	 common	 realist	 response	 to	 PI	 is	 selective	 scepticism,	 i.e.,	 drawing	 a	 principled	
distinction	between	the	true,	belief‐worthy	elements	of	empirically	successful	theories,	which	
tend	to	be	preserved	from	old	to	new	theories,	and	the	false,	belief‐unworthy	elements,	which	
tend	to	be	discarded.	As	Chakravartty	(2007,	29)	puts	this:	
As	 in	 life	 generally,	 so	 too	 in	 science:	 do	 not	 believe	 everything	 you	 are	 told.	 Not	 all	
aspects	of	scientific	theories	are	to	be	believed.	Theories	can	be	interpreted	as	making	
many	claims	about	the	nature	of	reality,	but	at	best	one	has	good	grounds,	or	epistemic	
warrant,	for	believing	some	of	these	claims.	Only	some	aspects	of	theories	are	likely	to	be	
retained	as	the	sciences	march	on.	
Selective	scepticism	comes	in	many	flavours.	A	notable	example	is	Kitcher’s	(1993,	149)	
distinction	between	a	theory’s	working	posits,	which	employ	theoretical	terms	that	refer	to	real	
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unobservable	entities,	and	presuppositional	posits,	which	do	not.	Various	versions	of	structural	
realism	also	try	to	distinguish	between	the	true	elements	of	mature	theories,	and	all	the	rest.		
ER	enters	 the	picture	here,	 as	an	 influential	 version	of	 selective	 scepticism.	Hacking’s	
(1983,	Ch.16)	ER	makes	two	distinctions:	between	theories	and	entities,	and	between	two	kinds	
of	unobservable	entities:	experimental	entities	and	theoretical	entities.	Hacking	argues	for	realism	
only	about	experimental	entities.	Experimental	entities	are	entities	that	scientists	manipulate	to	
study	other	phenomena.	Electrons	are	experimental	entities,	because	experimental	physicists	
spray	them	to	study	weak	neutral	currents,	which	are	theorized	to	be	carried	by	bosons.	A	slogan	
Hacking	coins	for	ER	is	“if	you	can	spray	them	then	they	are	real”	(1983,	23).	In	addition	to	the	
fact	 of	 their	 existence,	 Hacking	 (1983,	 265)	 argues	 that	 we	 can	 know	 a	 modest	 number	 of	
“home	 truths”	 about	 experimental	 entities,	 which	 consist	 of	 thinly	 theory‐laden	 low‐level	
generalizations	about	their	well	understood	causal	properties;	for	example,	their	mass,	spin,	and	
charge.	 Hacking	 contrasts	 these	 low‐level	 generalizations	 or	 “home	 truths”	 with	 full‐blown	
scientific	theories	about	unobservables,	which	are	not	belief‐worthy.			
ER	in	not	an	innocent	doctrine.	It	significantly	narrows	the	scope	of	SR.	While	ER	leaves	
in	 electrons,	 photons,	 protons,	 and	positrons,	 it	 leaves	out	neutrino,	 bosons,	 and	black	holes	
(Hacking	1989),	as	well	as	theories	as	such,	as	opposed	to	the	entities	that	populate	them.	Its	
modesty	arguably	makes	ER	a	more	defensible	position,	but	 it	dissatisfies	many	realists,	who	
would	like	SR	to	have	a	wider	scope.		
In	 sum,	Hacking’s	ER	draws	a	 clear	 distinction	between	observable	and	experimental	
entities,	 about	which	 realism	 is	warranted,	 and	 everything	 else.	 Hacking’s	 argument	 for	 ER,	
however,	is	less	clear.	In	what	follows,	I	consider	five	interpretations	of	his	argument,	starting	
with	NMA.		
I	stress	that	within	this	paper,	I	distinguish	argument	types	on	an	epistemic	basis,	rather	
than	 structural.	 I	 distinguish	 argument	 types	 based	 on	 the	 type	 of	 epistemic	 warrant	 the	
argument	 confers	 on	 its	 conclusion.	 I	 am	 aware	 that	 there	 are	 other	 ways	 of	 drawing	 the	
boundaries	between	arguments.	I	also	acknowledge	that	the	distinctions	may	not	be	as	clear‐cut	
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as	I	present	them.	My	choice	of	terminology	for	classifying	arguments	types,	however,	should	not	
hinder	my	substantive	point,	which	is	that	it	is	possible	to	interpret	Hacking’s	argument	in	five	
ways	that	differ	significantly	in	the	type	of	epistemic	warrant	they	enjoy.	
3. The	NMA	Interpretation	
The	first	interpretation	of	Hacking’s	argument	for	ER	is	as	NMA.	Recall	that	under	the	IBE	model,	
we	 legitimately	 infer	 the	 truth	 of	 our	 best	 explanation	 of	 some	 given	 facts.	 But	why	 are	we	
entitled	to	treat	explanatory	merits	as	likeliness	indicators?	There	are	various	possible	answers	
to	 this	question,	 but	within	 this	 paper,	 I	 adopt	 the	 view	 that	our	 justification	 for	doing	 so	 is	
empirical	and	context	relative,	specifically,	relative	to	our	background	knowledge.	On	this	view,	
IBE	does	not	name	a	formal	inference,	but	an	abstract	pattern	whose	force	and	success	depend	
on	the	specific	background	assumptions	involved,	and	whose	specific	form	changes	with	context.	
Explanatory	merits	are	empirical	observations.	For	example,	if	a	court	infers	a	defendant’s	guilt	
from	 the	 fact	 that	 her	 fingerprints	 were	 found	 in	 the	 crime	 scene,	 a	 person	 matching	 her	
description	was	seen	fleeing	the	crime	scene,	etc.,	this	inference	reflects	the	court’s	knowledge	
of	how	crimes	are	usually	committed.	Generally	speaking,	we	observe	regularities,	see	that	some	
events	 are	 more	 frequent	 than	 others,	 and	 develop	 our	 explanatory	 merits	 based	 on	 these	
observations	(Ben‐Menahem	1990;	Day	&	Kincaid	1994).	
Against	PI,	 realists	may	argue	 that	not	all	 empirical	 success	 is	 the	 same.	Realists	may	
distinguish	weak	from	strong	or	genuine	empirical	success.	According	to	this	view,	truth	explains	
empirical	success	only	if	“empirical	success	is	robust,	significant	enough	(sufficiently	novel	and	
abundant	to	be	in	need	for	explanation),	and	truth	is	a	good	[putative]	explanation”	(Solomon	
2001,	25).	Realists	may	insist	that	while	there	may	be	other	good	explanations	of	weak	empirical	
success,	truth	is	the	best	and	only	explanation	of	genuine	success.		
If	realists	want	to	take	this	route,	however,	they	face	a	twofold	challenge.	They	need	to	
show	 (1)	 that	 their	 criteria	 for	 genuine	 empirical	 success	 are	 principled	 and	 non‐question	
begging,	i.e.,	not	constructed	ad	hoc	to	favour	current	science;	(2)	that	we,	unlike	past	historical	
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actors,	are	in	a	privileged	epistemic	position	to	distinguish	genuine	success	from	weak	success	
(Lehoux	2012,	206‐220).	Hacking’s	argument	for	ER	may	be	interpreted	as	rising	to	this	twofold	
challenge,	and	reconstructed	as	follows:		
(NMA1)		 Contemporary	experimental	physicists’	success	in	manipulating	experimental	
entities	 to	study	other	phenomena	 is	much	more	 impressive	 than	previous	
empirical	 successes	 in	 the	 history	 of	 science	 in	 a	 way	 that	 makes	 it	
qualitatively	different	from	it.	
(NMA2)		 ER	is	the	only	philosophy	that	doesn’t	make	this	success	a	miracle.	
(NMA3)	 Therefore,	ER	is	true.	
Some	textual	evidence	supports	this	interpretation.	Clearly,	Hacking	thinks	that	current	
experimental	practice	is	qualitatively	different	from	that	of	the	19th	century	and	before,	such	that	
it	can	support	realism	in	a	way	that	previous	practice	could	not:	“Anti‐realism	about	atoms	was	
very	 sensible	…	 a	 century	 ago.	 Anti‐realism	 about	any	 sub‐microscopic	 entities	was	 a	 sound	
doctrine	 those	 days”	 (1983,	 274;	 emphasis	 in	 the	 origin).	 “Assumptions	 about	 the	 minute	
structure	 of	 matter	 could	 not	 be	 proven	 then.	 The	 only	 proof	 could	 be	 indirect…	 Such	
indirectness	need	never	produce	conviction	in	the	philosopher	inclined	to	instrumentalism	or	
some	other	brand	of	idealism”	(1983,	173).		
Hacking	 writes	 that	 we	 have	 “evidence”	 and	 “proof”	 for	 the	 reality	 of	 experimental	
entities.	The	most	straightforward	logical	inference	structure	in	which	Hacking’s	claims	about	
experimental	practice	function	as	evidence	is	IBE.	Yet	Hacking	seems	to	deny	that	his	argument	
is	an	IBE,	which	seemingly	makes	the	NMA	interpretation	a	non‐starter:	
The	argument…	is	not	that	we	infer	the	reality	of	electrons	from	our	success.	We	do	not	
make	 the	 instruments	 and	 then	 infer	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 electrons,	 as	 when	we	 test	 a	
hypothesis,	and	then	believe	it	because	it	passed	the	test.	That	gets	the	time‐order	wrong.	
By	now	we	design	apparatus	relying	on	a	modest	number	of	home	truths	about	electrons	
to	produce	some	other	phenomenon	that	we	wish	to	investigate	(1983,	165).		
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Once	upon	a	time	the	best	reason	for	thinking	that	there	are	elections	might	have	been	
success	in	explanation…	I	have	said	that	ability	to	explain	carries	little	warrant	of	truth…	
Luckily	we	no	longer	have	to	pretend	to	infer	from	explanatory	success	(i.e.	from	what	
makes	 our	minds	 feel	 good).	 Prestcott	et	al.	 don’t	 explain	phenomena	with	 electrons.	
They	know	how	to	use	them	(1983,	271‐272).	
Nevertheless,	 I	 think	the	NMA	interpretation	is	viable.	We	may	distinguish	the	type	of	
scientific	 activity	 that	 best	 supports	 the	 reality	 of	 electrons	 (theoretical	 explanation	 versus	
experimental	manipulation)	from	the	type	of	argument	Hacking	is	giving	for	their	reality	(IBE	
versus	 another	 type	 of	 argument).	 The	 explananda	 of	 scientific	 explanations	 are	 specific	
phenomena	associated	with	electron	 theories,	while	 the	explananda	of	 the	NMA	are	 “science	
itself	and	its	history	of	empirical	success	as	a	whole”	(Ladyman	2014).	Clearly,	Hacking	denies	
that	mere	explanatory	success	of	electron	theories	supports	the	reality	of	electrons.	This	does	
not	mean	that	his	own	argument	is	not	an	IBE.	Hacking’s	argument	may	still	be	read	as	a	NMA.	
The	NMA	reconstruction	constitutes	a	prima	facie	strong	argument	for	SR.	It	takes	the	
sting	 out	 of	 PI,	 by	narrowing	 the	 base	 of	 the	 induction	 in	 its	 inductive	 formulation	 (PI0),	 or	
denying	premise	(PI1)	in	the	reductio	formulation.	Additionally,	its	conclusion	is	strong	–	it	states	
the	reality	of	electrons,	rather	than	merely	that	the	belief	in	their	reality	is	rational.	The	NMA	
reconstruction	would	not	convince,	however,	those	antirealists	who	reject	the	validity	of	IBE	in	
general.		
4. The	Indispensability	Interpretation	
An	 indispensability	 argument	 “purports	 to	 establish	 the	 truth	 of	 some	 claim	 based	 on	 the	
indispensability	of	the	claim	in	question	for	certain	purposes	(to	be	specified	by	the	particular	
argument)”	(Colyvan	2014,	fn.1).	Indispensability	arguments	are	inter	alia	used	for	supporting	
mathematical	Platonism.	They	state	that	reference	to	mathematical	entities	is	indispensable	to	
the	practice	of	mathematics,	thus	we	should	commit	to	their	existence	(Colyvan	2014).	Similar	
arguments	exist	in	meta‐ethics	for	the	reality	of	moral	norms	(Enoch	2011).		
	Structurally,	IBE	is	an	indispensability	argument,	where	the	indispensable	claims	are	the	
explanans,	 and	 the	 purpose	 is	 explanation.	 Recall,	 however,	 that	 in	 this	 paper,	 I	 distinguish	
 ‐	9	‐	
arguments	 types	 on	 epistemic	 grounds,	 rather	 than	 structural.	 Epistemically,	 IBE	 and	
indispensability	arguments	that	are	not	IBE	are	of	two	types,	because	they	confer	different	types	
of	epistemic	warrant	on	their	respective	conclusions.	As	I	use	the	term	here,	the	warrant	of	IBE	
is	empirical.	By	contrast,	the	warrant	of	indispensability	arguments	that	are	not	IBE	is	grounded	
in	the	coherence	of	practical	and	epistemic	rationality;	namely,	the	requirement	for	consistency	
between	belief	and	action.	If	one	cannot	avoid	acting	as	if	p	is	true,	then	for	the	sake	of	rationality,	
one	should	believe	that	p.	Otherwise,	one	 is	guilty	of	 “intellectual	dishonesty”	 (Putnam	1975,	
347).4	
Some	things	Hacking	writes	seem	to	be	in	line	with	an	indispensability	interpretation	of	
his	argument	for	ER:		
The	vast	majority	of	experimental	physicists	are	realists	about	some	theoretical	entities,	
namely	the	ones	they	use.	I	claim	that	they	cannot	help	being	so	(1983,	262;	italics	in	
the	origin,	bold	added).		
As	 a	 first	 approximation,	 then,	Hacking’s	 indispensability	 argument	may	be	 reconstructed	as	
follows:		
(IA1)	 For	the	purpose	of	experimentally	studying	other	phenomena	we	cannot	help	
treat	experimental	entities	as	real.		
(IA2)	 Therefore	we	are	rationally	compelled	to	believe	that	experimental	entities	
exist.	
Several	difficulties	arise	with	this	reconstruction.	The	first	is	raised	by	Hacking	himself:	
Even	if	experimenters	are	realists	about	entities,	it	does	not	follow	that	they	are	right.	
Perhaps	 it	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 psychology:	 maybe	 the	 very	 skills	 that	 make	 for	 a	 great	
experimenter	go	with	a	certain	cast	of	mind	that	objectifies	whatever	he	thinks	about	
(1983,	265).		
Hacking’s	 reply	 to	 this	 objection	 is	 that	 experimenters	 do	 not	 believe	 in	 the	 reality	 of	 all	
theoretical	 entities,	 only	 experimental	 entities.	 Thus	 he	 concludes	 that	 experimenters’	
                                                 
4	This	is	not	to	deny	that	an	IBE	may	have	a	double	warrant.	I	discuss	this	option	in	§5.	
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compulsion	to	believe	in	experimental	entities	is	not	psychological	(1983,	265).	Hacking’s	reply,	
however,	seems	unsatisfactory.	We	may	hypothesize	that	the	very	skills	that	make	for	a	great	
experimenter	go	with	a	cast	of	mind	that	objectifies	whatever	she	thinks	she	uses	as	a	tool,	and	
the	objection	still	 stands.	A	second	problem	with	 this	 reconstruction	 is	 that	 the	 term	“we”	 is	
ambiguous.	Who	is	rationally	compelled	to	believe	in	electrons	–	only	experimenters	who	use	
them,	or	 the	 rest	 of	 us	 as	well?	 It	does	not	 follow,	 for	 instance,	 from	 the	 fact	 that	practicing	
religious	people	are	rationally	compelled	to	believe	in	God	that	everybody	else	must	also	believe	
in	 God.	 Third,	 there	 is	 a	 gap	 between	 claiming	 that	 it	 is	 rationally	 required	 to	 believe	 that	
electrons	exist	(an	epistemic	claim)	to	claiming	that	electrons	exist	(a	metaphysical	claim).		
A	plausible	reconstruction	that	addresses	these	problems	is	this:	
(IA3)		 For	the	purpose	of	experimentally	studying	other	phenomena,	experimental	
physicists	cannot	help	treat	experimental	entities	(but	not	other	theoretical	
entities)	as	real.	
(IA4)		 Therefore,	they	must	rationally	believe	that	experimental	entities	exist.	
(IA4)		 For	forming	rational	beliefs	about	which	physical	entities	exists,	people	who	
are	 not	 experimental	 physicists	 must	 rationally	 defer	 to	 experimental	
physicists’	epistemic	authority.	
(IA5)	 Therefore,	we	must	rationally	believe	that	experimental	entities	exist.		
(IA6)		 What	we	must	rationally	believe	about	physical	entities	is	true.		
(IA7)		 Therefore,	experimental	entities	exist.		
This	improved	reconstruction	raises	other	worries.	Regarding	(IA4),	it	 is	controversial	
that	lay	people	must	rationally	defer	to	experts’	epistemic	authority.	Some	argue	for	it	(Hardwig	
1985);	others	reject	it	(Goldman	2001).	Additionally,	can’t	we	similarly	argue	that	for	forming	
rational	beliefs	about	religious	entities	we	must	rationally	defer	to	clergy’s	epistemic	authority?	
And	 why	 are	 the	 relevant	 experts	 physicists,	 rather	 than	 philosophers,	 some	 of	 whom	 are	
antirealists?	(IA6)	also	seems	suspect.	If	it	is	derived	from	a	general	principle	according	to	which	
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what	we	are	rationally	compelled	to	believe	is	true,	it	seems	too	strong.	If	the	claim	applies	only	
to	physical	entities,	it	seems	ad	hoc.	
I	do	not	wish	to	give	an	exhaustive	list	of	prima	facie	difficulties	with	the	argument.	My	
point	is	that	any	plausible	indispensability	argument	for	ER	would	seem	to	include	controversial	
premises	that	do	not	directly	bear	on	the	SR	debate,	such	as	about	when	it	is	rational	to	defer	to	
expert	 testimony.	Realists	should	prima	 facie	not	commit	to	any	particular	stance	about	such	
premises.	The	prospects	of	developing	a	robust	indispensability	argument	for	ER	therefore	seem	
somewhat	grim.		
5. The	Transcendental	Interpretation	
Transcendental	arguments	have	a	venerable	history	in	philosophy.	They	may	be	described	as	
trying	 to	 reverse‐engineer	 reality	 from	 appearances.	 That	 is,	 they	 take	 as	 a	 premise	 some	
obvious	fact	about	our	mental	life	and	proceeded	to	claiming	that	some	other	state	of	affairs	in	
reality	is	a	necessary	condition	for	the	first	one.	They	aim	at	revealing	the	necessary	enabling	
conditions	of	unquestionable	experiences	or	the	unquestionable	possession	or	employment	of	
some	kind	of	knowledge	or	cognitive	ability.	They	are	often	used	as	replies	to	sceptical	claims	
that	 question	 the	 aspects	 of	 reality	 that	 the	 transcendental	 arguments	 try	 to	 establish.	
Transcendental	arguments	proceed	from	their	premises	to	their	conclusion	by	the	preservation	
of	logical	or	necessary	truths	(Bardon	2006).		
Transcendental	 arguments,	 indispensability	 arguments,	 and	 IBEs	 are	 sometimes	
characterized	 as	 belonging	 to	 an	 overlapping	 family	 of	 arguments,	 since	 they	 have	 a	 similar	
structure.	Within	 this	paper,	 I	 distinguish	argument	 types	on	epistemic	grounds,	 rather	 than	
structural,	 and	want	 to	 keep	 the	 distinction	 between	 them	 clear.	 Thus,	within	 this	 family	 of	
structurally	similar	arguments,	I	call	an	“IBE”	an	argument	whose	epistemic	warrant	is	empirical,	
an	“indispensability	argument”	an	argument	whose	warrant	is	grounded	in	the	requirement	of	
consistency	between	epistemic	and	practical	 rationality,	 and	a	 “transcendental	 argument”	an	
argument	whose	epistemic	warrant	stems	from	the	preservation	of	logical	or	necessary	truths	
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from	its	premises	to	 its	conclusion.	The	premises	of	a	 transcendental	argument	for	SR	would	
typically	include	some	uncontroversial	claims	about	observables,	and	the	conclusion	would	be	
to	the	existence	of	some	unobservables.		
If	Hacking	makes	a	transcendental	argument,	it	may	be	to	the	effect	that	the	existence	of	
electrons	 and	 other	 unobservable	 experimental	 entities	 is	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 the	
possibility	 of	 the	 experimental	 practice	 in	 the	 physics	 laboratory.	Morrison	 (1990,	 17),	who	
suggests	 a	 transcendental	 reading	 of	 Hacking’s	 argument	 for	 ER,	 interprets	 his	 argument	 as	
follows:		
[T]he	argument	for	realism	could	perhaps	be	seen	as	one	which	claims	that	entities	and	
their	properties	must	be	presupposed	in	successful	practice;	it	simply	makes	no	sense	to	
doubt	the	ontological	and	epistemological	claims	that	render	that	practice	meaningful.5	
According	to	Morrison’s	transcendental	reading,	Hacking’s	argument	may	be	to	the	effect	
that	“the	commitment	involved	in	manipulation	is	one	that,	contra	antirealists	like	van	Fraassen,	
involves	more	than	empirical	adequacy”	(1990,	18),	Specifically,	I	suggest	that	it	may	be	to	the	
effect	 that	 the	 preservation	 of	 reference	 of	 the	 term	 “electron”	 to	 electrons	 (or	 other	
unobservable	experimental	entities)	during	radical	theory	changes	is	a	necessary	condition	for	
the	possibility	of	the	experimental	practice	Hacking	describes.	To	understand	why	this	may	be	
so,	 recall	 the	 challenge	 that	 Kuhn	 (1970)	 presents	 to	 SR	 of	 explaining	 how	 reference	 of	
unobservable	 terms	 is	 preserved	 during	 paradigm	 shifts,	 in	which	 their	meaning	 undergoes	
radical	changes.	To	answer	this	challenge,	Hacking	draws	on	Putnam’s	causal	theory	of	meaning,	
according	to	which	the	reference	of	a	term	is	determined	by	a	causal	chain	to	an	initial	baptizing	
event	of	its	use,	rather	than	a	speaker’s	understanding	of	its	meaning.		
Putnam’s	theory	only	explains	how	the	preservation	of	reference	is	possible.	It	is	up	to	
Hacking	to	show	that	it	is	preserved.	If	we	draw	a	parallel	to	Kant’s	transcendental	arguments,	
                                                 
5	 According	 to	 my	 taxonomy	 of	 argument	 types,	 Morrison’s	 interpretation	 can	 also	 be	 read	 as	 an	
indispensability	interpretation	
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we	may	interpret	Hacking	as	trying	to	show	this.	As	Lipton	(2003,	216)	writes,	Kuhn	and	Kant	
share	much	in	common,	but	differ	in	that	Kuhn	is	“Kant	on	wheels”:		
The	Kantian	view	is	that	the	truths	we	can	know	are	truths	about	a	‘phenomenal’	world	
that	 is	 the	 joint	 product	 of	 the	 ‘things	 in	 themselves’	 and	 the	 organising,	 conceptual	
activity	of	the	human	mind.	Kuhn,	however,	is	Kant	on	wheels.	Where	Kant	held	that	the	
human	contribution	to	the	phenomenal	world	is	invariant,	Kuhn’s	view	is	that	it	changes	
fundamentally	across	a	scientific	revolution.		
If	Hacking	indeed	employs	Kant’s	methodology	of	transcendental	arguments,	it	may	therefore	be	
for	 establishing,	 contra	 Kuhn,	 the	 invariance	 of	 reference	 to	 experimental	 entities	 despite	
paradigm	shifts,	similarly	to	the	invariance	of	Kant’s	categories.		
We	may	find	some	hints	for	a	transcendental	reading	in	Hacking’s	text.	Hacking	writes	
that	early	Kant	regarded	theoretical	entities	as	part	of	the	noumena,	and	only	later	abandoned	
this	view,	realizing	its	inconsistency	with	his	larger	philosophy.	But	then	Hacking	asks:	
What	position	ought	Kant	 to	have	taken	about	theoretical	entities	 that	really	do	some	
work	in	science?	What	would	he	have	done	when,	in	the	twentieth	century,	we	learned	
how	to	manipulate	and	even	spray	electrons	and	positrons?	(1983,	100‐101)		
Hacking	speculates	that	Kant	would	not	have	changed	his	position,	but	Hacking	may	be	inclined	
to	take	a	different	stance,	and	use	Kant’s	own	method	to	prove	their	existence.		
Critically	evaluating	a	transcendental	argument	for	ER	is	somewhat	difficult.	The	validity	
of	a	transcendental	argument	crucially	depends	on	whether	it	preserves	logical	and	necessary	
truths	from	its	premises	to	its	conclusion	without	smuggling	in	controversial	hidden	premises.	
Thus,	 evaluating	 the	 validity	 of	 a	 transcendental	 argument	 requires	 a	 careful	 scrutiny	 of	 an	
elaborate	formulation	of	the	argument.	But	if	Hacking’s	argument	is	transcendental,	he	provides	
at	best	a	suggestive	sketch,	which	is	insufficient	for	such	a	scrutiny.		
Moreover,	it	is	unclear	if	a	transcendental	argument	can	be	provided	for	ER	in	general,	or	
whether	 a	 separate	 argument	 should	 be	 provided	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 every	 unobservable	
experimental	 entity.	 This	 is	 because	 such	 an	 argument	 must	 start	 with	 an	 uncontroversial	
description	of	an	experimental	practice	at	the	level	of	observable	entities	alone,	and	then	show	
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that	 some	 conclusions	 about	 unobservables	 logically	 or	 necessarily	 follow	 from	 it.	 Since	
scientists	manipulate	entities	in	many	ways	and	experimental	practice	significantly	varies,	it	is	
unclear	 that	 a	 generalized	 description	 of	 scientific	 experimental	 practice	 at	 the	 level	 of	
observables,	which	is	required	for	a	general	transcendental	argument	for	ER,	can	be	provided.		
Another	difficulty	with	a	transcendental	argument	for	ER	is	that	it	is	unclear	whether	its	
conclusion,	namely,	that	the	reality	of	an	unobservable	entity	is	a	necessary	presupposition	for	
an	experimental	practice	that	involves	its	manipulation,	 is	right	in	light	of	apparent	empirical	
examples	 to	 the	 contrary.	 Morrison	 (1990,	 9‐13)	 describes	 a	 case	 in	 which	 physicists	
manipulated	quarks	to	study	charm,	while	they	were	still	not	convinced	of	the	reality	of	quarks.	
The	consistency	of	 the	data	 they	obtained	served	as	a	 retroactive	reason	 for	believing	 in	 the	
existence	 of	 both	 the	 manipulated	 and	 studied	 entities.	 For	 Morrison,	 this	 means	 that	
“manipulation	can	occur	in	context	where	there	are	no	firmly	held	beliefs	about	the	entities	being	
manipulated”	 (1990,	 9).	 Even	 worse,	 Gelfert	 (2003)	 describes	 in	 detail	 a	 case	 in	 which	
experimenters	manipulate	quasi‐particles,	which	they	believe	to	be	mere	theoretical	constructs	
that	do	not	genuinely	exist.		
Hacking	might	object	that	Morrison’s	example	is	a	case	of	the	“experimenter’s	regress”	
(Collins	1985),	where	the	success	conditions	for	believing	that	a	detector	is	working	properly	
and	that	an	entity	has	in	fact	been	detected	are	logically	interdependent.	Hacking	might	object	
that	 such	a	 case	 should	not	be	given	 in	 support	of	 SR.	Hacking	might	argue	 that	 the	 case	he	
describes	differs	from	Morrison’s	quark	case	in	that	the	success	conditions	for	believing	that	the	
detection	equipment	works	properly	are	logically	 independent	of	the	conditions	for	believing	
that	the	experiments	succeeded.	But	then,	one	may	wonder	what	is	so	special	for	Hacking	about	
empirical	success	 in	the	physics	laboratory	as	opposed	to	other	empirical	success.	What	is	so	
special	about	spraying	electrons	for	studying	bosons,	which	warrants	a	belief	in	their	existence,	
as	opposed	to	spraying	electrons	for	producing	an	image	on	an	old	CRT	television,	which	the	
antirealist	can	dismantle	with	her	usual	argument	toolkit?		
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There	 is,	 however,	 a	 prominent	 criticism	 of	 transcendental	 arguments,	 to	 which	 a	
transcendental	argument	for	ER	should	not	be	susceptible.	Transcendental	arguments	seemingly	
establish,	at	most,	conclusions	about	what	beliefs	are	rational	or	conceptually	necessary,	but	they	
fall	short	of	establishing	conclusions	about	the	external	world,	as	realists	would	like.	Because	
their	premises	seemingly	concern	only	subjects’	inner	world,	transcendental	arguments	cannot	
warrant	 conclusions	 about	 the	 external	 world,	 since	 the	 conclusions	 should	 follow	 only	
deductively	 or	 necessarily	 (Stroud	 1968).	 Thus,	 a	 transcendental	 argument	 for	 SR	 may	 be	
criticised	on	the	grounds	that	in	principle	it	is	not	able	to	establish	conclusions	about	what	exists	
in	the	external	world,	including	unobservables.		
As	 Grundmann	 &	 Misselhorn	 (2003)	 argue,	 however,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 overcome	 this	
problem	by	introducing	into	a	transcendental	argument	a	minimal	premise	about	the	external	
world	that	both	the	realist	and	antirealist	would	find	unobjectionable,	and	would	function	as	a	
bridge	principle	that	establishes	a	relation	between	subjective	experience	and	objective	reality.	
Within	 the	SR	 debate,	 this	 suggestion	 looks	 promising,	 because	 scientific	 antirealists	 are	not	
idealists.	 They	 deny	 neither	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 mind‐independent	 world	 (M1),	 nor	 that	
knowledge	about	observables	is	possible	(Chakravartty	2013).	Thus,	in	principle,	it	is	possible	to	
introduce	into	a	transcendental	argument	for	ER	an	uncontroversial	premise	about	observables	
from	which	some	conclusions	about	unobservables	would	 logically	or	necessarily	 follow.	For	
example,	an	argument	may	introduce	some	uncontroversial	claims	about	the	“home	truths”	that	
are	associated	with	electrons	and	can	be	expressed	 in	observable	 terms	alone,	such	as	about	
their	behaviour	as	charged	particles,	and	derive	 the	existence	of	electrons,	qua	unobservable	
entities,		from	them.		
How	do	 the	 three	 interpretations	 of	Hacking’s	 argument	 that	 I	 reviewed	 so	 far	work	
together?	Do	they	jointly	provide	a	stronger	case	for	ER	than	each	of	them	provides	alone?		The	
first	 three	 arguments	 seem	 mutually	 consistent.	 They	 all	 accept	 the	 realist	 commitments	
enumerated	 in	 §2.	 Because	 they	 enjoy	 warrants	 of	 different	 kinds,	 they	 implicitly	 rely	 on	
different	 background	assumptions	about	what	makes	 a	 claim	 justified.	While	different,	 these	
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warrants	 need	 not	 be	 incompatible	with	 each	 other;	 for	 example,	 a	 claim	 can	 have	 both	 an	
empirical	warrant	and	follow	deductively	or	necessarily	from	uncontroversial	premises	about	
observables.	While,	as	I	have	argued,	the	indispensability	argument	requires	filling	in	missing	
premises	that	concern	the	argument’s	own	scope	and	applicability	and	do	not	directly	bear	on	
the	SR	debate,	there	is	little	reason	to	think	that	these	premises	need	to	be	in	tension	with	the	
NMA	 and	 transcendental	 arguments.	 Therefore,	 the	 three	 arguments	 may	 work	 together	
providing	a	more	robust	case	for	ER	than	any	of	them	provides	alone.		
Yet	the	mutual	compatibility	and	strength	of	these	three	arguments	depends	also	on	one's	
general	philosophical	commitments.	Not	all	scientific	realists	would	be	willing	to	endorse	all	the	
three	arguments,	or	any	of	them.	For	example,	Maddy	(2007,	403‐405)	argues	that	the	task	of	
the	scientific	realist	philosopher	is	critically	analyzing	and	explicating	scientists’	own	detection	
claims	 of	 unobservables,	 rather	 than	 adding	 an	 extra	 layer	 of	 philosophical	 analysis	 and	
argumentation	 to	 them.	Maddy	 rejects	 IBEs,	 transcendental	 arguments,	 and	 indispensability	
argument	 for	 SR,	 since	 she	 views	 them	 as	 adding	 such	 an	 extra	 layer	 of	 philosophical	
argumentation.	Thus,	she	would	not	side	with	any	of	the	three	arguments	reviewed	so	far.	I	think,	
however,	that	Maddy	is	wrong	to	reject	IBE,	since	scientists'	own	detection	claims	are	often	most	
charitably	interpreted	and	explicated	as	IBEs,	where	the	existence	of	a	particular	unobservable	
entity	is	the	best	explanation	of	a	particular	observable	phenomenon.6	We	should	also	bear	in	
mind	that	 IBE	 is	a	very	common	form	of	 inference	 in	many	non‐philosophical	contexts	(Ben‐
Menahem	1990).	 I	 therefore	 believe	 that	 at	 least	 some	 IBEs	 for	 SR	 are	 in	 line	with	Maddy’s	
philosophical	 naturalism.	 If	 I	 am	 right,	 then	 a	 scientific	 realist	 who	 adheres	 to	 Maddy’s	
philosophical	methodology	might	accept	the	NMA	argument	for	ER,	but	reject	the	transcendental	
and	indispensability	arguments.		
                                                 
6	In	fact,	it	is	hard	to	interpret	Maddy’s	(2007,	406)	own	explication	and	analysis	of	Perrin’s	argument	for	the	
existence	of	atoms	other	than	as	an	IBE.	Even	according	to	Maddy's	own	account,	Perrin	inferred	the	existence	
of	unobservable	atoms	from	the	fact	that	they	produced	an	observable	pattern	that	was	identical	to	the	pattern	
of	Brownian	motion	of	observable	entities,	where	the	production	of	such	Brownian	motion	by	atoms	had	been	
a	novel	prediction	of	statistical	thermodynamics.		
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I	 have	 so	 far	 suggested	 three	 different	 interpretations	 of	 Hacking’s	 argument	 for	 ER,	
which	 enjoy	 epistemic	warrants	 of	 different	 kinds.	 I	 have	 argued	 that	while	 different,	 these	
interpretations	need	not	necessarily	be	in	tension	with	each	other.	In	the	next	two	sections,	I	
review	 two	 additional	 interpretations	 –	 the	 Vichian	 interpretation,	 and	 the	 no‐argument	
interpretation,	and	argue	that	they	stand	in	tension	with	the	first	three	interpretations	as	well	as	
with	each	other.			
6. The	Vichian	Interpretation	
For	 reviewing	 the	 fourth	 interpretation,	 consider	 the	 following	 excerpt	 from	 Hacking	
(1983,	247):		
The	best	kinds	of	evidence	for	the	reality	of	a	postulated	or	inferred	entity	is	that	we	can	
begin	to	measure	it	or	otherwise	understand	its	causal	powers.	The	best	evidence,	in	turn,	
that	we	have	 this	kind	of	understanding	 is	 that	we	can	set	out,	 from	scratch,	 to	build	
machines	that	will	work	fairly	reliably,	taking	advantage	of	this	causal	nexus.	
This	echoes	Italian	philosopher	Vico’s	Maker’s	Theory	of	Knowledge.	Vico	(1668‐1744)	
equates	 truth	with	making	(“verum	 ipsum	 factum”),	and	argues	that	 inasmuch	as	we	produce	
something,	 we	 also	 know	 its	 causes	 and	 understand	 its	 true	 principles.	 “The	 verum‐factum	
principle	defines	knowledge	or	science	as	pre‐eminently	causal	 in	character	and	as	 therefore	
concerned	with	the	genesis	or	construction	of	a	phenomenon”	(Zagorin	1984,	18).7	
Boon	 &	 Knuuttila	 (2011)	 sympathetically	 read	 Hacking	 in	 this	 spirit.	 They	 interpret	
Hacking	 as	 claiming	 that	 a	 mere	 mirroring	 (isomorphism,	 similarity,	 etc.)	 notion	 of	
representation,	which	dominates	 the	philosophy	of	 science,	 is	 empty	without	 an	 intervening	
component.	The	epistemic	 value	of	models	 lies	 in	our	ability	 to	manipulate	 them	 for	gaining	
knowledge	about	the	world	or	use	them	to	manipulate	the	world.	Boon	&	Knuuttila	(2011,	87)	
write:	
                                                 
7	I	thank	Yemima	Ben‐Menachem	for	drawing	my	attention	to	the	resemblance	between	Hacking	and	Vico.		
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…taking	a	cue	from	Hacking,	we	suggest	that	the	representational	idiom	does	not	describe	
adequately	 our	 actual	 theoretical	 practices,	 which	 instead	 of	 trying	 to	 accurately	
represent	the	world,	are	more	tuned	to	our	active	engagement	with	the	world	than	what	
is	customarily	supposed.		
We	may	reconstruct	Hacking’s	Vichian	argument	as	follows:	
(VA1)	 Experimenters	 reliably	 produce	 phenomena	 by	 manipulating	 the	 causal	
powers	of	electrons.	
(VA2)	 Having	such	causal	manipulative	abilities	is	a	sufficient	condition	for	having	
knowledge	of	electrons,	where	knowledge	entails	truth.	
(VA3)	 Having	knowledge	of	electrons	entails	having	knowledge	that	electrons	exist.	
(VA4)	 Therefore,	experimenters	know	that	electrons	exist.	
(VA5)		 Therefore,	electrons	exist.		
The	warrant	of	this	argument	is	grounded	in	whatever	principles	underlie	Vico’s	Maker	
Theory	of	Knowledge.	Thus,	(VA2)	seems	to	carry	the	epistemic	weight	of	the	argument.	Vico	
thinks	that	humans	can	only	have	knowledge	of	the	human	world,	because	only	God	produces	
natural	 phenomena.	 As	 Carrier	 (2011,	 48‐52)	 argues,	 however,	 we	 nowadays	 study	 non‐
naturally	occurring	phenomena	of	our	own	making,	and	use	them	to	study	other	phenomena	as	
well.	Carrier	doubts,	however,	that	causal	manipulative	abilities	are	sufficient	for	knowledge	for	
two	 reasons.	 First,	 sometimes	 scientists	 know	 how	 to	 produce	 certain	 effects	 without	 fully	
understanding	 the	underling	 causal	 dynamics	 at	 play.	 Second,	manipulative	 ability	 is	 usually	
consistently	achieved	under	certain	background	conditions,	and	scientists	do	not	always	know	
how	changing	them	would	affect	the	outcome.		
The	Vichian	argument	does	not	square	nicely	with	the	first	three	interpretations	or	with	
the	standard	realist	commitments.	Vico’s	equation	of	truth	with	making	violates	SR	commitment	
to	 a	 non‐epistemic	 theory	 of	 truth	 (S2).	 That	 is,	 the	 Vichian	 argument	 is	 framed	 within	 an	
anthropocentric	epistemology	that	equates	truth	with	making,	yet	realists	hold	that	the	truth	
values	of	claims	is	independent	of	the	human	ability	to	test	or	verify	them.	According	to	Hacking,	
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his	own	ER	can	be	expressed	in	terms	of	a	correspondence	theory	of	truth	or	something	like	it	
(1988,	291).		
Moreover,	 a	 Vichian	 framework	 forms	 a	 hierarchy	 of	 knowability,	 which	 seems	
incompatible	with	 the	hierarchy	assumed	within	 the	SR	debate.	Though	many	argue	 that	 the	
lines	 between	 observable	 and	 unobservable	 entities	 are	 blurry,	 it	 is	 still	 generally	 assumed	
within	 the	 SR	 debate	 that	 observable	 entities	 are	 on	 more	 secure	 epistemic	 grounds	 than	
unobservable.	That	is,	all	sides	to	the	debate	accept	that	we	have	knowledge	of	observables,	and	
the	debate	concerns	unobservables.	Manipulability	draws	the	epistemic	lines	differently	from	
observability.	It	places	manipulatable	entities,	such	as	unobservable	electrons	and	observable	
car	 engines,	 higher	 on	 its	 epistemic	 hierarchy	 than	 non‐manipulatable	 entities,	 such	 as	
unobservable	bosons	and	observable	hurricanes.		
I	do	not	suggest	that	a	Vichian	epistemology	and	the	standard	SR	assumptions	cannot	be	
reconciled	with	 each	other	 if	one	has	enough	philosophical	motivation	and	 free	 time.	 Such	a	
reconciliation,	however,	would	have	to	significantly	relax	the	realist	commitments,	to	an	extent	
that	it	would	be	unclear	if	ER	could	still	 legitimately	be	called	“realism”,	bearing	in	mind	that	
because	ER	is	antirealist	about	theories,	it	is	already	a	modest	realist	position.	Alternatively,	such	
a	reconciliation	would	take	the	wind	out	of	the	Maker’s	Theory	of	Knowledge,	because	it	would	
have	to	relax	its	anthropocentric	focus,	which	makes	it	attractive	to	begin	with.	Thus,	a	robust	
case	for	ER	that	includes	a	Vichian	line	of	argument	seems	unpromising.	
7. The	Non‐Argument	Interpretation	
The	last	interpretation	of	Hacking’s	argument	is	that	it	is	not	an	argument	at	all,	as	Hacking	does	
not	 think	 that	 an	 argument	 can	 establish	 the	 reality	 of	 electrons.	 Rather,	 the	 experimental	
practice	directly	illustrates	their	reality.	According	to	this	interpretation,	the	epistemic	warrant	
for	ER	lies	in	directly	perceiving	the	laboratory	practice,	rather	than	any	feature	of	an	argument	
for	it.	According	to	this	reading,	the	roots	of	Hacking’s	(non)	argument		
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lie	in	the	anti‐theoretical	traditions	of	pragmatism	and	in	the	commonsensical	reaction	
to	Berkeley's	idealism	made	famous	by	Samuel	Johnson.	When	Johnson	manipulated	a	
stone	with	his	foot	he	at	once	affirmed	that	the	stone	was	more	than	a	mere	theoretical	
construct	and	that	he	was	warranted	in	applying	commonsense	reasoning	to	affirm	its	
existence	(Lyons	and	Clarke	2002,	xx‐xxi).	
This	reading	accords	with	the	fact	that	Hacking	does	not	give	an	explicit	argument	for	ER,	
but	gives	a	detailed	vivid	description	of	the	experimental	practice	in	the	physics	laboratory.	It	
also	accords	with	Hacking’s	depiction	of	his	conversation	with	a	physicist,	in	which	the	physicist	
said	physicists	spray	positrons,	and	after	which	Hacking	became	a	realist	(1983,	23).		
In	suggesting	this	interpretation,	I	follow	Greco’s	interpretation	of	Moore’s	famous	proof	
of	an	external	world,	in	which	Moore	(1962,	144)	gestures	with	his	hands	while	saying	“here	is	
one	hand”	and	 “here	 is	another”,	and	 then	deduces	 the	existence	of	an	external	world.	Greco	
(2002)	argues	that	the	epistemic	force	of	Moore’s	proof	does	not	lie	in	any	feature	of	Moore’s	
argument,	but	 in	 the	direct	perception	of	an	undeniable	 fact,	 i.e.,	Moore’s	hands.	Greco	reads	
Moore’s	argument	as	playful,	where	Moore’s	very	point	 is	 that	we	do	not	know	that	external	
things	exist	by	proving	this,	but	by	perceiving	them.	This	is	similar	to	Brown’s	(1997)	claim	that	
some	pictures	constitute	in	and	by	themselves	mathematical	proofs,	because	they	allow	people	
to	directly	perceive	the	truth	of	a	mathematical	theorem,	without	needing	to	translate	them	to,	
or	accompany	them	with	an	argument.		
This	interpretation	does	not	require	a	reconstruction,	but	we	may	follow	Greco’s	Moore	
and	give	the	following	reconstruction,	which	should	be	read	playfully:	
(NA1)		 Experimenters	spray	electrons.		
(NA2)	 Therefore,	electrons	exist.		
The	 non‐argument	 interpretation	 returns	 SR	 to	 its	 common‐sense	 roots.	 Before	 SR	
shattered	into	countless	positions	with	hair‐splitting	epistemic	and	ontic	distinctions	between	
them,	 it	was	considered	a	common‐sense	philosophy,	which	takes	our	best	science	at	 its	 face	
value,	 and	 elucidates	 scientists’	 own	 philosophy.	 In	 particular,	 it	 was	 the	 common‐sense	
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response	to	logical	empiricists’	elaborate	take	on	scientific	claims,	their	truth,	and	their	meaning.	
Yet,	one	may	question	the	commonsensical	status	of	knowledge	of	unobservable	entities,	such	
as	electrons,	as	opposed	to	observable	entities,	such	as	Moore’s	hands.	In	response,	Hacking	may	
argue	 that	 for	experimenters	and	 those	who	study	 them,	knowledge	of	electrons	becomes	as	
commonsensical	as	knowledge	of	one’s	hands.	The	prospects	of	such	a	suggestion	need	further	
exploring.	
There	are	difficulties	 reconciling	 the	non‐argument	argument	 for	ER	with	 the	 rest.	As	
Morrison	observes,	if	we	accept	the	transcendental	interpretation,	“we	must	dismiss	Hacking's	
claim	that	manipulation	offers	direct	proof	of	the	reality	of	entities”	(1990,	18).	The	same	would	
apply	to	all	the	rest	of	the	interpretations	too.	According	to	the	non‐argument	interpretation,	the	
rest	 of	 the	 arguments	 commit	 a	 category	 mistake:	 they	 try	 to	 prove	 with	 a	 philosophical	
argument	 what	 can	 only	 be	 proven	 with	 a	 direct	 unmediated	 physical	 demonstration.	 The	
non‐argument	interpretation,	then,	nullifies	any	other	philosophical	arguments	for	ER.	It	thus	
cannot	be	integrated	within	a	robust	case	for	ER.	
8. Conclusion	
While	Hacking’s	catchy	slogan	“if	you	can	spray	them	then	they	are	real”	seems	 intuitive	and	
persuasive,	 and	 Hacking’s	 argument	 for	 Entity	 Realism	 seems	 simple	 and	 straightforward,	
appearances	can	be	misleading.	I	distinguished	five	possible	readings	of	Hacking’s	argument	for	
Entity	Realism	based	on	the	epistemic	rationale	that	underlies	them:	(1)	a	no‐miracles	argument,	
whose	 epistemic	 warrant	 is	 empirical;	 (2)	 an	 indispensability	 argument,	 whose	 warrant	 is	
grounded	in	the	requirement	of	consistency	between	epistemic	and	practical	rationality;	(3)	a	
transcendental	argument,	whose	warrant	is	grounded	in	the	preservation	of	logical	or	necessary	
truths	from	a	set	of	uncontroversial	premises	to	its	conclusion;	(4)	a	Vichian	argument,	whose	
warrant	 is	grounded	 in	an	epistemology	 in	 the	spirit	of	Vico’s	Maker’s	Theory	of	Knowledge,	
which	connects	truth	with	making;	(5)	a	non‐argument,	where	the	epistemic	warrant	does	not	
lie	in	any	feature	of	a	philosophical	argument	for	Entity	Realism,	but	in	the	direct	unmediated	
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demonstration	power	of	the	experimental	practice	in	the	physics	laboratory.	The	version	of	the	
argument	a	scientific	realist	would	like	to	side	with,	if	any,	depends	on	deep	issues	at	the	heart	
of	the	debate,	such	as	the	nature	of	truth,	representation,	and	knowledge.		
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